Telegram userId verified before processing
A stranger's message is dropped before any processing — no reply, no log entry. The userId cannot be forged via a regular message — it's signed by the Bot API.
You dictate a task, the assistant builds your file — and your data stays in its own isolated space. No one else gets in: not a neighbor on the service, not an admin.
While the assistant builds your file, your data is processed in an isolated space of its own. Each layer is independent: even if one is compromised, the rest hold.
When the assistant builds your file, the work runs inside a dedicated Docker container: an isolated mini-system inside the server. Its own disk slice, its own processes, its own permissions. No shared space between users.
On top of the container — two more layers. User namespace remapping: inside the container the process is a regular user, but on the host it's "nobody" — no rights outside your own data. If a kernel CVE drops tomorrow, a container escape gains nothing. Plus a syscall interception layer between the build process and the host kernel.
Build containers cannot see each other on the network. A request from your address to a neighbor's address simply doesn't arrive. Internal service interfaces are closed at two independent firewall levels (INPUT and DOCKER-USER chains).
One user cannot bring down the service — accidentally or otherwise. Each container has a cap on memory, processes, and disk (workspace 2 GB). Request frequency is bounded by a token bucket. If you exceed the limit, the bot asks you to clean up — it doesn't crash and doesn't affect anyone else.
Not part of the onion, but they work along the entire request path.
A stranger's message is dropped before any processing — no reply, no log entry. The userId cannot be forged via a regular message — it's signed by the Bot API.
Filesystem operations are validated against an explicit allowlist. Bash commands are also checked before execution.
TLS 1.2+ on all connections: Telegram → bot, bot → model providers, bot → YooKassa.
Your message travels from your device to Telegram's servers over TLS 1.2+. The same applies on every hop from the bot to its providers.
The bot checks the Telegram userId against an explicit allowlist. Messages from unknown accounts are dropped before any processing — no reply, no log entry.
A separate session and a separate build container are created for each user. Your history, your files, and your settings are physically inaccessible to anyone else.
The request is forwarded to one of the providers. All providers, under the terms of API access, do not use requests to train their models.
Payments are handled by YooKassa — a Russian payment service licensed by the Central Bank of Russia. PCI DSS certified, the same standard banks use. We only see the fact of payment, not your card details.
A list of sub-processors that receive data when you use the service.
These commands wipe the assistant's memory, your build container, and your session. Your workspace data is removed immediately.
Payment history is retained for 5 years under Russian accounting law. Technical audit logs (without conversation content) — 30 day rolling window.
To permanently leave the service, email abuse@proboi.site. We will delete your remaining data within 30 days.
All connections — Telegram → bot, bot → providers, bot → YooKassa — are protected by TLS.
Timeweb Cloud disk encryption is used. There is no additional application-level encryption — all protections are implemented at the OS and container level.
In the event of a personal data breach we will notify Roskomnadzor within 24 hours and affected users within 72 hours in accordance with applicable law.
Found a bug or vulnerability? Email abuse@proboi.site. We respond within 7 business days. The same address handles abuse and legal inquiries.
These three points are stated deliberately — so you can make an informed decision.
A language model needs plaintext. A channel where even the provider cannot see the content cannot exist by design. This is how all AI services work. It is an architectural property of all LLMs.
A layered architecture reduces the likelihood of an attack and limits its scope. But no one can promise protection against tomorrow's 0-days, including the largest clouds.
These certifications are needed for enterprise contracts. We invest in real technical measures, not audit paperwork. If a formal certificate is a hard requirement for your use case — that is a fair deal-breaker.
No architecture protects against what the user voluntarily sends out. So:
/forget or /newIf you need a formal document for a security team review, write to us — we'll send one.
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